For our purposes, the term Muslim will refer to the Filipino Muslims. This essay is not representative of the views of the Muslim people, because I myself am not Muslim. Whether or not the Moro National Liberation Front should be treated as the sole representatives of the Filipino Muslims is also a subject of some debate. My friends from Mindanao attest to the fact that not every Muslim agrees with the goals of the MNLF/MILF. When the Marcos Government inked the Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF in 1976, the latter was still unaffected by divisiveness. Now, Hashim Salamat has his own faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), while Abubakar Janjalani (recently deceased) leads the Abu Sayyaf; whether their goals remain the same is also a matter of contention. For the purposes of this essay, I will take the Muslim cause to mean the cause for true autonomy. I will not concern myself with creating a distinction among the factions; for our purposes, I have taken the Muslim problem as a topic, not the groups that represent it. Most of the material presented here is inspired by an article by Prof. Sukarno D. Tanggol, of the Mindanao State University-Marawi City.

Spanish Conquest and the Moro Problem
When the Spaniards first arrived in these islands, Islam was beginning to spread in the Visayas and Luzon. When the Spaniards first came to Manila in 1570, it was a principality ruled by Muslim rajahs who were members of the ruling family of Brunei. Spanish attempt to colonize and Christianize the natives of this archipelago, while relatively successful in Luzon and Visayas, proved a failure in Mindanao, wherethe Muslims had a more stable political system. Their refusal to accept Christianity and the stubborn armed resistance they exhibited created what amounts to a Muslim or Moro problem to the Spaniards. By calling the natives Moors, or Moro, the Spaniards must have carried with them whatever psychological hangups they had from their Moorish conquerors.

During the period of more than three centuries of Spanish rule, the Spanish repeatedly attempted to gain a foothold on Mindanao. An important aspect of the military expeditions against the Moros was the use of Christianized Indios that would plant the seeds of misunderstanding and mutual prejudice between these two brown brothers.

When the Americans entered the scene in the late nineteenth century, Mindanao was offered on a silver platter by the Spaniards in the Treaty of Paris, against the protestation of the Muslims. It was as if Spain *owned* Mindanao, when it did not. But what the Spaniards failed to accomplish in three centuries, the Americans did in a few decades. With the failure of Spanish military means, the Americans banked on what is now known as a policy of attraction for the Moros. While the Spanish did not want to educate the natives, the Americans used education as a colonial tool to subjugate the Moros. The result was our cerebral captivity. Apple instead of Atis. Planting rice is never fun.., a child's song, serves to illustrate our supposed inferiority -- we are a nation of farmers, and such a song degrades the national profession, so to speak.

In 1917, the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes was organized to adminsiter the areas occupied by non-Christians. This was abolished during the commonwealth period with the creation of the Office of the Commissioner for Mindanao and Sulu (Senate Committee on National Minorities 1963).

Another important aspect of American policy was the use of settlement programs for Mindanao. Although migration of Christianized Filipinos from the northern part of the archipelago started during the Spanish days, these were only a few settlement areas along the northern part of Mindanao when the American regime started. Settlement colonies were deliberately established as a tool toneutralize Moro resistance and as a vital means towards exploitation of the vast economic resources of Mindanao.

Between 1913 to 1917, for example, the Insular Government established seven agricultural colonies in Mindanao, covering a total of 15,619 hectares of land and attracting less than 1,500 permanent settler families. In this program, each family was given between 8-16 hectares, as well as cash advances to cover costs of transportation, housing, implements, animals, and others. It was a generous policy that proved to be economic failures. In 1919, a new migration policy was adopted that encouraged settlers with adequate funds to support them. Implemented by the Inter- Island Migration Division (IMD) of the Bureau of Labor, it provided transportation to 6,080 settler families, most of whom went to Mindanao.

When the United States was about to grant independence to the Filipinos, Muslim datus expressed their desire that Mindanao should not be made part of the Philippines. This plea was not heeded and Mindanao found itself being claimed again by their co-natives, albeit they are now Christianized and westernized to a certain extent.

The dominant approach of the Manila government regarding the Muslims and other cultural communities was integration. But while the policy of integrationmay be taken as implying cultural plurality and respect for the uniqueness of existing groups, the actual meaning given is assimilation where the dominant culture is supposed to absorb the minority culture. A dominant assumption here is that the cultural communities are inferior people whose habits are better reformed to conform to those of the more "civilized" dominant group.

Another important aspect of government policy towards Mindanao and the Muslims is the resettlement of people from Luzon and Visayas. On February 12, 1935, the Quirino-Recto Colonization act (Act No. 4197) was passed which marked the beginning of a more vigorous government effort to open and colonize Mindanao. Then, in 1939, the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) was established which organized three big sttlement areas, two of which were in Mindanao: Koronadal and Allah Valleys in what used to be the undivided province of Cotabato. While these areas were inhabited by Lumads and Moros, there was little regard for their interest. Numerous other settlement projects were initiated, each of them economic failures. Most of these resettlement projects were established in Mindanao, the so-called "Land of Promise" and most of the settler families came from Luzon and Visayas. This policy of resettlement reoceeded at the expense of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao whose legitemate claims over their ancestral lands were sacrificed, what with the imposition of the Torrens System of land ownership which was alien to the natives of Mindanao. While economic failures, these projects succeed in marginalizing the Muslims and the Lumads in Mindanao, and that they provided for one of the strongest pillars of the continuing trouble in the South-Land conflict.

Marcos and Aquino: Autonomy as a Policy
When Ferdinand Marcos became President of the Republic of the Philippines, hes was to preside over a costly conflagration -- the war in the early seventies between the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Being the most violent manifestation of the Muslim problem, this war of the 70's invited the attention of the international community, particularly the Muslim world. Whether or not we agree in the suggestion that this war was the innovation of those who wanted to prolong themselves in power, it led to that piece of document called the Tripoli Agreement, signed between the MNLF and the Phillipine Governent, with the participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) on December 23, 1976.

Self-determination was a favorite goal then among the Muslims, something that would mediate between autonomy and secession, as MNLF expression would manifest. Secession was course far from the minds of the majority and the government was bent on granting autonomy to the Muslims. Or so it seemed.

For the unilateral implementation of the Tripoli Agreement by the Philippine Government, two regional autonomous government, one for Region IX and another for Region XII, were created. However, these governments were very much wanting in substance; and only roughly approximated the minimum requirements for self- determination. The Marcos government claimed that in a referendum held on April 17, 1977, the people of Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan opted out of autonomy. The truthfulness of this statement is debatable; it was during the time of Martial Law, and in these provinces big businesses had (and continue to have) a big presence.

Whatever meaning given to it, autonomy became an official tool to quell Muslim unrest. Under Marcos, it succeeded as a buffer goal that would absorb much of the secessionist heat. It aslo contained Muslim insurgency.

When Aquino became President, negotiations were again initiated between the MNLF and the Philippine Government. Recognizing the failure of Marcos to finally put to rest the Muslim problem, the Aquino government tried to sharpen autonomy and excise once and for all from Philippine society this pestering disease. For the first time, regional autonomy for the Muslims and the Cordillera area was enshrined in our Constituion (1987 Philippine Constitution, Article X, Sections 15-21). Through Administrative Order No. 30, the Office of the Peace Commissioner (OPC) was created to undertake research studies of peace. It provided technical support to the negotiating teams of the government. On October 2, 1987, the Mindanao-Consensus-Building Panel (MCPB) was organized. It became helpful in the consultative activities of the government leading to the final organization of the Mindanao Regional Consultative mission (RCC). On July 24, 1987, as called for by the constitution, the President ordered the setting up ofthe Regional Consultative Commission, whose members were sworn to office in Cotabato City on March 26, 1988.

When the RCC submitted its draft in an Organic Act for Muslim autonomy to Congress, its members were expecting an active participation in the Congressional deliberation, as the Constitution mandates. But they were mistaken, as both houses of Congress went on their task of drafting an autonomy law for Muslim Mindanao, with their drafts submitted by their respective committees on local government.

In April 1989, the Senate and the Lower House passed on third reading their respective Muslim Autonomy bills. A bicamoral conference was organized which agreed on a consolidated version on June 8, 1989. On August 1, 1989, Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 6734. To implement this autonomy program, a plebiscite was held on November 9, 1989 to ascertain the number of provinces and cities to be included in the area of autonomy. And on February 17, 1990, the first election for regional officials of ARMM was held. The formal inaguration of ARMM was held on November 6, 1990.

Thus far, we can identify a few dominant tools used to curb the Muslim problem. War, integration, resettlement, and autonomy were used at one time or another to solve this irritant, however it was percieved. It seems that Manila does not exactly know the solution to the Southern problem. If it does, it decides and acts half-heartedly. Imagine the irony. War was used as a means for pacification. Integration was used as a policy to assimilate the Muslims. Resettlement projects were implemented to unsettle the Moros. And autonomy was concieved to deny the Moros the same.

The present structure of the government is incapable of solving the problem. A feeling of being ignored and neglected is prevalent; Mindanao contibutes almost 50% to the country's coffers, but little more than 12% are devoted to it. Ignorance by the general populace regarding the Mulsim, as well as the Mindanao, situation, is prevalent. So just what exactly is required? The prospects of any government action would depend on the attitude of the government regarding the proble. Should it decide to grant the demand for secession or autonomy of a large part of Mindanao, it would surely meet a lot of obstacles. The Christian majority of the affected areas would understandably object, and, owing to their numerical superiority, the government will have to think many times over before venturing into any drastic solutions. A few non- Muslims may go into terroristic actionbs just to dramatize their opposition to any genuine Muslim autonomy, especially on places not dominated by Muslims. A Christian problem may arise to take the place of a Muslim problem. Should the government opt for inaction or another round of tokenism, it could harden the minds of the Muslims. And can we actually blame them? These people aren't stupid.

For a solution to be formulated, an important requirement is the sincerity and political will of the national leadership to respond to the Muslim problem. Another would be the willingness of both parties to compromise. But to really get to a solution, the general consiousness of the people needs to be modified, Christian and Muslim alike. Information is key. Both sides must not rely on popular media alone; television and newspapers often tend to be either biased, centralized, or sensationalistic. Both sides must learn to understand each other; too often, Filipino Catholics tend to be too self-righteous to the point of seeing those not of the same faith as automatically wrong, even non-Catholic Christians. It is a cliché, yes, but it is also a valid answer to the problem.

And this presents one of the biggest obstacles to the peace process. It is an extremely difficult task to get both sides to see eye to eye, much less understand each other. I cannot help but feel pessimistic, along with many others, about the peace process. Both sides have not been fully cooperative, and while for a time things looked to be getting better, the present administration seems incapable of handling the situation, what with the seeming incompetence of the current President. Loathe as I am to say it, I miss the days of the Ramos administration. At least the intelligence of the head of state was never an issue. But this pessimism notwithstanding, I hope that the government is truly committed to solve the Muslim Problem, and that the Philippines will, one day, for the first time, be truly one nation.